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DISPARATE IMPACT AND THE ADEA: SO,
WHO IS GOING TO BE IN THE
COMPARISON GROUP?
TIMOTHY TOMMASO

I.

INTRODUCTION

A decision has been made and the debate has ended. The
Supreme Court, in Smith v. City of Jackson,' has ruled that under2
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA)
disparate impact claims are available.3 This decision came twentyone years after the Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.4 developed
the doctrine of disparate impact as a means for establishing
liability under Title VII' of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title
VII").'
Now the big question becomes: who can be in the
comparison group for the plaintiff to establish a disparate impact
claim under the ADEA? This comment is the first to lay the
foundation for what standard courts should accept as proper in
deciding who a plaintiff can use as a comparison group.
Part II will explore the purpose of the ADEA and introduce
the two major employment discrimination doctrines available:
disparate treatment and disparate impact. It will also discuss how
to establish a prima facie case for both doctrines under Title VII,
and for disparate treatment under the ADEA. Part III will explore
what types of tests can be used to prove ADEA disparate impact
claims and the problems associated with each test. Part IV will
propose the use of a case-by-case analysis for deciding what

Juris Doctorate Candidate, 2007, The John Marshall Law School.
Thank you to the John Marshall Law Review staff for all your hard work.
Thank you also to my friends, for always keeping me grounded. Most
importantly, thank you to my parents, for their constant support and
encouragement.
1. 544 U.S. 228 (2005).
2. Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (1967) (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (2000)).
3. Smith, 544 U.S. at 238.
4. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
5. Id. at 435-36.
6. Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701-16, 78 Stat. 241, 253-66 (1964) (codified at
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to 2000e-16 (2000)).
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comparison group plaintiffs can use to establish a disparate
impact claim.

II. BACKGROUND
A. Employment DiscriminationDoctrines
Over the past forty years, Congress has enacted two key
employment discrimination doctrines: Title VII, which prohibits
discrimination on the basis of race, sex, color, national origin, and
religion;8 and the ADEA, which prohibits discrimination on the
basis of age. 9 Under these statues, two methods for establishing
employment discrimination have developed within the courts:
disparate treatment and disparate impact."
Proof of discriminatory motive is vital under a disparate
treatment claim." Proof of discriminatory motive, however, is not
vital under a disparate impact claim, 2 because the required proof
"involves employment practices that are facially neutral in their
treatment of different groups but that in fact fall more harshly on
7. Other imperative discrimination statues Congress has enacted include:
Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-213 (2000)
(making it illegal to discriminate against individuals with disabilities);
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, 8 U.S.C. 1324(b) (1994) (making
it illegal to discriminate on the basis of citizenship status).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
9. 29 U.S.C. § 623 (2000). The purpose of the ADEA is to protect overforty-year-old workers from age-based discrimination. 29 U.S.C. § 621. The
ADEA makes it illegal to "fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual
or otherwise discriminate against any individual... because of such
individual's age." 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1).
10. Some scholars have broken down employment discrimination into four
categories: (1) disparate treatment; (2) employment practices or policies that
contain past discrimination; (3) disparate impact (policies or practices having
an adverse impact, which are not justified by business necessity); and (4)
"failure to make reasonable accommodation to an employee's religious
observance or practices or to a qualified employee's disability." See Keith R.
Fentonmiller, The Continuing Validity of Disparate Impact Analysis for
Federal-SectorAge DiscriminationClaims, 47 AM. U.L. REV. 1071, 1074 n.15
(1998); see also BARBARA LINDEMANN & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAW 4 (3d ed. 1996) (explaining that all employment
discrimination cases can be analyzed under one of the four categories, which
help in the basic understanding of the elements of an employment
discrimination case). As Frentomiller points out, though, the ADEA "contains
no explicit duty of reasonable accommodation. Additionally, the 'present
effects of past discrimination' method of proof could be viewed as a subset of
both disparate impact and disparate treatment analysis depending upon the
facts of the case." Fentonmiller, supra note 10, at 1074 n.15.
11. See Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, at 335 n.15
(1977) (explaining further that disparate treatment is simple to understand
because a protected employee, such as an African-American employee, is
treated with less favor because of his color).
12. Id.
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one group than another and cannot be justified by business
necessity." 3 Accordingly, an employer can be held liable under the
disparate impact theory with no proof of discriminatory intent or
motive. 4 The crux of a discrimination claim is the same: whether
an employer discriminated against an employee. 5 Moreover, the
Supreme Court has held that both theories, disparate impact and
disparate treatment, are essentially equivalent, 6 and that both
theories may be applied to the same set of facts."
B. DisparateTreatment
Generally, there are four methods of proving disparate
treatment in an employment discrimination case. 8 The first
method, which is the easiest and most obvious method of proving
discrimination, is direct evidence. 9 However, direct evidence is
rare; therefore, a majority of plaintiffs establish discrimination
The
through circumstantial evidence, the second method. °
13. Id. While a disparate impact claim brought under Title VII requires
employer justification of business necessity, the Supreme Court ruled that a
disparate impact claim brought under the ADEA only requires the employer to
justify its practice by showing a reasonable factor other than age. Smith, 544
U.S. at 239; see also Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 613 (1993)
(holding that if the employer's practices are motivated by reasons other than
age there is no disparate treatment under the ADEA).
14. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15.
15. Fentonmiller, supra note 10, at 1075.
16. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 987 (1988)
(plurality opinion) (holding that the court was allowed to analyze the
employer's discretionary promotional system under a disparate impact claim).
17. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15.
18. While only four methods of proving disparate treatment are discussed
here, unlawful harassment based on an individual's protected characteristic is
a viable theory under Title VII. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57,
66 (1986) (finding a claim of "hostile environment" to be valid disparate
treatment sex discrimination claim under Title VII). Other courts have
extended a hostile work environment theory of discrimination to claims
against federal employers. See generally Hathaway v. Runyon, 132 F.3d 1214
(8th Cir. 1997) (ruling on sexual harassment claims against the U.S. Postal
Service). Finally, some courts have extended the hostile environment claim to
the ADEA. See Crawford v. Medina Gen. Hosp., 96 F.3d 830, 834 (6th Cir.
1996) (holding that the hostile environment claim of discrimination extends to
the ADEA); see also EEOC v. Massey Yardley Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 117
F.3d 1244, 1249 n.7 (11th Cir. 1997) (presuming, without deciding, that the
hostile environment theory applies to the ADEA). But see Burns v. AAFMcQuay, Inc., 980 F. Supp. 175, 180 (W.D. Va. 1997) (refusing to extend the
hostile environment theory of discrimination to the ADEA).
19. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 124-25 (1985)
(holding that an employer's policy, which diminished the right of sixty-year-old
and above pilots to take the spot of less senior flight engineers, was unlawful
because of age discrimination).
20. Fentonmiller, supra note 10, at 1075-76. The Supreme Court has also
established a "pattern or practice" method for proving discrimination. Int'l
Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. at 336. First, there is a trial to
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Supreme Court established the framework to prove discrimination
through this method.' Although this framework was established
in the context of Title VII, it has been used and accepted by courts
in ADEA claims.
The third method of proving disparate treatment is known as
the "mixed-motives" analysis.23 This analysis was also framed in
the context of Title VII,24 but has been applied to ADEA claims. 5
This type of case falls within the "fuzzy area between faciallydiscriminatory policies and wholly circumstantial cases of
intentional discrimination."26
The fourth and final method of proving disparate treatment is
by showing a "pattern and practice" of discrimination and is
generally used in class action suits. 7 Under this method, a
plaintiff must show widespread discrimination through statistical
and anecdotal evidence.'
C. DisparateImpact
The Supreme Court adopted the disparate impact theory in
Griggs.29 This case was a racial discrimination case brought under

determine if a discriminatory policy exists. Fentonmiller, supra note 10, at
1075 n.22. If this policy does exist, the court holds "mini-trials" to determine if
the individuals who claim they were disparately impacted, were actually
disparately impacted by that policy. Id.
21. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05 (1973)
(illustrating a disparate treatment claim as proved by circumstantial evidence:
the plaintiff has the burden of establishing a prima facie case; the burden then
shifts to the defendant, when it can explain a non-discriminatory reason for its
action. Finally, the plaintiff has a chance to rebut the defendant's proffered
reason).
22. See Hazen, 507 U.S. at 612 (stating that McDonnell Douglas created a
"proof framework applicable to [the] ADEA"); Keller v. Orix Credit Alliance,
Inc., 130 F.3d 1101, 1108 (3d Cir. 1997) (applying the McDonnell Douglas
framework to an ADEA case); Greene v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 98 F.3d 554,
557-59 (10th Cir. 1996) (same); Cuddy v. Carmen, 694 F.2d 853, 855-57 (D.C.
Cir. 1982) (same); Douglas v. Anderson, 656 F.2d 528, 531-32 (9th Cir. 1981)
(same).
23. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989) (plurality
opinion) (holding that once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case for a
disparate treatment claim the "defendant may avoid a finding of liability only
by proving... that it would have made the same decision even if it had not
taken the plaintiffs [protected characteristic] into account").
24. Id.
25. See, e.g., Nitschke v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 68 F.3d 249, 253 (8th
Cir. 1995) (presuming that the "mixed motive" analysis is available under the
ADEA).
26. Fentonmiller, supra note 10, at 1077.
27. Id.
28. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 772 (1976).
29. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
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Title VII. 3 ° The Court held that "good intent or absence of
discriminatory intent [will] not redeem employment procedures or
testing mechanisms that operate as 'built-in headwinds' for
31
minority groups and are unrelated to measuring job capability."
Consequently, the employer's policy requiring employees to have a
high school diploma violated Title VII because such a requirement
disparately affected minorities, even if this was not the employer's
intent.32
Prior to Hazen Paper Co. v Biggins,' the majority of circuit
courts allowed disparate impact claims to be brought under the
ADEA.34 However, this all changed once Hazen was decided. In
Hazen, the Court ruled that where an employer's actions are
motivated by reasons other than age, there is no liability under
the ADEA."
Importantly, Justice Kennedy suggested in his
concurrence, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Thomas, that he did not believe disparate impact claims were
available under the ADEA.36 Notwithstanding the dicta in Hazen,
the second, eighth, and ninth circuits continued to rule that
disparate impact was available under the ADEA. 37 However, after

30. On the day Title VII took effect, the employer required employees to
pass an intelligence test and have a high school diploma to qualify for any type
of promotion. Id. at. 427. Because of the poor quality education AfricanAmericans received during that time, this new policy hindered a great
majority of African-Americans from qualifying for a promotion. Id. at 430.
31. Id. at 430.
32. Id. at 429.
33. 507 U.S. 604.
34. See Fisher v. Transco Services-Milwaukee, Inc., 979 F.2d 1239, 1244
(7th Cir. 1992) (ruling that a disparate impact claim was available under the
ADEA); Holt v. Gamewell Corp., 797 F.2d 36, 37 (1st Cir. 1986) (recognizing a
disparate impact claim brought under the ADEA); Lowe v. Commack Union
Free Sch. Dist., 886 F.2d 1364, 1372 (2d Cir. 1989) (stating that a disparate
impact claim could be brought under the ADEA); Leftwich v. Harris-Stowe
State College, 702 F.2d 686, 690 (8th Cir. 1983) (recognizing a disparate
impact claim brought under the ADEA); MacNamara v. Korean Air Lines, 863
F.2d 1135, 1141 (3rd Cir. 1988) (inferring that a disparate impact claim was
available under the ADEA); lervolino v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 796 F.2d 1408,
1413-14 (11th Cir. 1986) (same).
35. 507 U.S. at 613.
36. Id. at 618 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Specifically, Justice Kennedy
stated that "there are substantial arguments that it is improper to carry over
disparate impact analysis from Title VII to the ADEA." Id.
37. See, e.g., Dist. Council 37 v. N.Y. City Dep't of Parks & Rec., 113 F.3d
347, 351 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that disparate impact claims are still
available under the ADEA); Smith v. City of Des Moines, Iowa, 99 F.3d 1466,
1469-70 (8th Cir. 1996) (same); Mangold v. California Pub. Utilities Comm'n,
67 F.3d 1470, 1474 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating in dictum that disparate impact
claims are still available under the ADEA). However, the Ninth Circuit's
District Courts developed a split within themselves. Compare EEOC v.
Newport Mesa Unif. Sch. Dist., 893 F. Supp. 927, 930 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (holding
that a disparate impact is available under the ADEA), with Frank v. United
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Hazen, the majority of Circuit Courts of Appeals - the First,"
Third,- Fifth," Sixth,4 Seventh,"' Tenth,' and Eleventh4' - ruled
disparate impact was not available under the ADEA.4
The Supreme Court, however, swung the other way in Smith,
holding that disparate impact claims are available under the
ADEA.' The Court noted that, other than the use of the word
"age" in the ADEA rather than the use of the words "race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin" in Title VII, the ADEA contained
language identical to what is found in Title VII. 7 Because
disparate impact claims are available under Title VII,' the Court
reasoned they should also be available under the ADEA.4 9 This
decision did nevertheless come with some restrictions.
Under a Title VII disparate impact claim, once the plaintiff
establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to
justify its practice or policy by proving that it is "job related" and
that there is a "business necessity."0 If proven, the burden shifts
Airlines, Inc., No. C-92-0692, 1997 WL 258890 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 1997)
(refusing to allow a disparate impact claim under the ADEA).
38. Mullin v. Raytheon Company, 164 F.3d 696, 703-04 (1st Cir. 1999).
39. DiBiase v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 48 F.3d 719, 734 (3d Cir. 1995).
40. Smith, 351 F.3d at 187.
41. Lyon v. Ohio Educ. Ass'n and Profl Staff Union, 53 F.3d 135, 140 n.5
(6th Cir. 1995).
42. Blackwell v. Cole Taylor Bank, 152 F.3d 666, 672 (7th Cir. 1998).
43. Ellis v. United Airlines, Inc., 73 F.3d 999, 1009 (10th Cir. 1996).
44. Adams v. Florida Power Corp., 255 F.3d 1322, 1326 (11th Cir. 2001).
45. See also Barry Kozak, The Cash Balance Plan:An Integral Component
of the Defined Benefit Plan Renaissance, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 753, 766
(2004) (noting that ostensibly the current trend before Smith was decided was
for courts to find that a disparate impact claim was not available under the
ADEA).
46. Smith, 544 U.S. at 239.
47. Id. at 231.
48. Id. at 236.
49. Id. Interestingly, while the Court ruled that disparate impact was
available under the ADEA, the Court did not find in favor of the parties
bringing suit on the disparate impact theory. Id. at 242. In that case, the City
of Jackson gave raises to all police officers to attract and retain qualified
workers. Id. at 230. However, those having less than five years experience
received a higher percentage raise than those with more than five years. Id.
Officers over the age of forty brought suit, claiming age disparate impact. Id.
The Court, however, ruled that the plaintiffs never identified any specific
practice adversely affecting older workers and that the city had a reasonable
reason for enacting the pay plan. Id. at 240. Thus, the plaintiffs did not
establish a viable disparate impact claim under the ADEA. Id. at 242.
50. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431 (1971) (explaining that business necessity is
the "touchstone" of the inquiry of whether the employer has a legitimate
reason for the questioned policy or practice); see also LINDEMANN &
GROSSMAN, supra note 10, at 106 (noting that the terms business necessity
and job-related are "intended to reflect the concepts enunciated by the
Supreme Court in Griggs" (quoting 137 Cong. Rec. S15273, S15276 (daily ed.
Oct. 25, 1991)). However, the Supreme Court was not very clear on what
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back to the plaintiff to prove that there was an alternative method
the employer refused to use, which would have achieved the
employer's desired result with a lesser disparate impact.6'
Under the ADEA, the burden on the employer is less
stringent. An employer need only show that the disparate impact
on the employee's age was due to any reasonable factor other than
age.52 Further, it is not required that the employer's selected
method be the only method for achieving the desired goal.u Thus,
the scope of liability for disparate
impact under the ADEA is
54
narrower than under Title VII.
Notwithstanding an employer's strong affirmative defense
under ADEA disparate impact claims, we are still left with a
confounding question: what comparison groups will a plaintiff use
to help establish his or her disparate impact claim? With that in
mind, we will now look at how to establish a prima facie case for
disparate impact claims brought under Title VII.
D. Establishinga PrimaFacie Case for DisparateImpact Claims
Under Title VII
To establish a prima facie case for disparate impact under
Title VII, the plaintiff must first identify a facially-neutral
these terms meant. Id. at 107; see also Judith J. Johnson, Semantic Cover for
Age Discrimination:Twilight of the ADEA, 42 WAYNE L. REV. 1, 41-42 (1995)
(noting that some courts require that the employer's practice or policy be
essential, while other courts merely require a rational relationship between
the employment practice and the employer's interest).
Interestingly enough, in 1989, the Supreme Court, in Wards Cove
Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), took more of an employer-friendly
view regarding disparate impact claims under Title VII. The Court held that
the plaintiff, in establishing his or her prima facie case, must prove that the
challenged employer's practice or policy had a significant disparate impact on
employment opportunities for the protected class and the non-protected class.
Id. at 657. If this is established, the employer must demonstrate that the
challenged practice serves, in a significant way, the employer's goals. Id. at
659. However, the employer need not show a business necessity; the inquiry is
only a "reasoned review of the employer's justification for his use of the
challenged practice." Id.
This decision led Congress to enact the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L.
No. 102-166, § 2, 105 Stat. 1071, 1071 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.). This act codified the holding in Wards Cove that the
plaintiff must demonstrate a specific practice that caused the disparate
impact. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i). However, Congress brought back the
requirement that the employer's reason is a business necessity and jobrelated. Id.
51. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii).
52. See Hazen, 507 U.S. at 613 (1993) (holding that the employer will not be
liable under the disparate impact theory if its actions are motivated by
reasons other than age, even if those reasons are clearly related to the
employee's age).
53. Smith, 544 U.S. at 242.
54. Id. at 239.
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employment practice.55 Second, he or she must present statistical
evidence showing that such a practice causes a disparity between
the class of employees that were allegedly disparately impacted
and other employees not adversely impacted.'
For instance, a
female employee can allege that her employer's hiring policy
disparately impacts female employees as compared to male
employees by using statistical data to illustrate the disparity.
The Supreme Court has given no definitive guidance on "just
what threshold mathematical showing of variance... suffices as
'substantial disproportionate impact.' 57 The lower courts also
have not used a uniform rule,58 nor does the text of Title VII
provide one. 9 Thus, there are several tests plaintiffs have used to
present statistical evidence showing that an employer's practice
causes disparate impact among a particular group of employees.'
One such test is the eighty percent rule, or the four-fifths
test.61
Adopted by the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission's ("EEOC") Uniform Guidelines on Employee
Selection Procedures,62 the four-fifths test states that an
employer's selection criterion has an adverse impact when
members of a protected group (e.g. females) are selected at a rate
less than four-fifths of the preferred class.'
For example, if
seventy percent of qualified males are hired, but only forty percent
of qualified females are hired, the ratio would be 4/7, or
approximately fifty-seven percent. Thus, under the EEOC's fourfifths rule, a disparate impact claim would exist.'

55. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 645-46 (codified in Title VII at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i)).
56. Id. at 650.
57. Moore v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 593 F.2d 607, 608 (5th Cir. 1979)
(per curiam).
58. See, e.g., Moore v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 19 FEP 232, 234 (E.D.
Tex. 1978) (stating that the lower courts have not used a uniform standard in
determining the existence of "adverse impact"), affd per curiam, 593 F.2d 607
(5th Cir. 1979).
59. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (stating only that a prima facie case
can be established if the adverse party demonstrates that the employer's
particular employment practice causes disparate impact based on "race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.. . ," but not what formula can be used to show
a substantial disparate impact).
60. For a discussion on the test used for statistical analysis, see LINDEMANN
& GROSSMAN, supra note 10, 1687-1740.
61. See, e.g., United States v. City of Chicago, 663 F.2d 1354, 1358 n.8 (7th
Cir. 1981) (finding adverse impact under the four-fifths rule); Bushey v. New
York State Civil Serv. Comm'n, 733 F.2d 220, 225-26 (2nd Cir. 1984) (same).
62. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1607.4(D).
63. LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 10, at 92.
64. See also, United States v. City of Chicago, 663 F.2d at 1358 n.8 (finding
disparate impact under the four-fifths rule when the selection rate of AfricanAmericans was 18% of that for whites); Bushey, 733 F.2d at 225-26 (finding
disparate impact under the four-fifths rule when the minority pass rate of test
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Perhaps the most commonly used test looks at whether a
disparity is sufficiently large enough that it becomes highly
unlikely to have randomly occurred." The "significant statistical
test" allows the court to find disparate impact when the selection
rate of members of the protected group is significantly different
from the expected selection rate in the absence of discrimination.66
The test determines the probability of obtaining the disparity by
chance,67 and many courts accept that a 0.05 probability level is
sufficient to rule out chance.' A 0.05 probability level means that
an observed disparity, or a greater disparity, would occur by
chance only one time in twenty cases." Thus, as the probability
level drops below 0.05, courts that utilize this test are likely to find
a disparate impact.
The two aforementioned tests deal with selection rates. The
plaintiff may use other types of statistical proof depending on the
situation, such as: pass/fail comparisons, population/workforce
comparisons, regression analyses, and other kinds of statistical
comparisons. °
Pass/fail selection tests simply compare the
was 25% compared with the non-minority pass rate of 50%); Easely v.
Anheuser-Bush, Inc., 572 F. Supp. 402, 406-07 (finding disparate impact
under the four-fifths rule when out of 1,500 applicants, only 30% of black
applicants passed a test, but 50% of white applicants passed; the three-fifths
being well below the four-fifths standard).
65. LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 10, at 90.

66. Id.
67. Id.

68. See, e.g., Billish v. City of Chicago, 962 F.2d 1269, 1285 (7th Cir. 1992)
(holding the 0.05 probability sufficient to rule out chance); Palmer v. Shultz,
815 F.2d 84, 92-96 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (same); Waisome v. Port Auth., 948 F.2d
1370, 1376 (2d Cir. 1991) (same).
Similarly, in Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 496 n.17 (1977), the
Supreme Court held that a disparity of two or three standard deviations was
sufficient to rule out chance. A two-tailed probability level of 0.05 corresponds
with two standard deviations. LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 10, at 91.
An explanation of the two-tailed analysis is as follows:
A 'two-tailed' analysis examines the probability of a departure in either
direction - either favoring or disfavoring the group alleging
discrimination - from the results that would have been expected in the
absence of discrimination.
A 'one-sided' analysis examines the
probability of a departure from such expected results in only one
direction, such as a departure disfavoring the group alleging
discrimination. There is a simple arithmetic relationship between these
approaches: A two tailed probability level is always two times the onetailed probability level. It is thus more difficult to prove statistical
significance when using a two-tailed approach.
Id. at 91 n.60.
69. See Waisome, 948 F.2d at 1376 (noting that social scientists regard a
two standard deviations finding significant, which translates into
approximately "one chance in 20 that the explanation for the deviation could
be random").
70. LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 10, at 89. Another kind of
statistical analysis includes a 'cohort analysis." Id. at 1700. This analysis is a
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percentage of the protected class that passes or fails a given test
with the majority group.7'
Population/workforce comparisons
"compare the availability of the protected group in the general
population or relevant labor market with the percentage of the
protected group in an employer's workforce (or portion thereof.)"72
Regression analyses estimate "the effect of several independent
variables (e.g. education, experience, performance, age, race, sex)
on a single dependent variable" (e.g. salary).73 This test is
commonly used when comparing wage rates between a protected
group and the majority group, because simply comparing wages
fails to take into account other facts such as education and
experience.74 These tests also may be used to determine whether a
plaintiff has established a disparate impact claim under Title VII.

statistical analysis which studies groups of employees that begin employment
at the same time and at the same level. Id. at 1700 n.66. The "cohort
analysis" has been used in pay and promotion discrimination cases. Id. at
1700.
Another type of analysis has been termed the "bottom line" concept. Id.
at 1701. Instead of comparing the selection rate of a group to a particular
component part in the hiring process (e.g. employees' pass/fail rate on a
particular test), this test compares the selection rate of a group to the overall
employment process. Id. This test has been used by both plaintiffs and
defendants.
Id. Using this test, the plaintiff would allege the whole
employment process had a disparate impact on his or her protected group,
even though no particular part of the hiring process was shown to have a
disparate impact. Id. In contrast, the defendant would show there was no
disparate impact from the whole employment process, even though there may
have been a disparate impact from a particular part of the employment
process. Id. The Supreme Court, however, has severely limited the use of this
statistical test. Id. at 1701-02.
71. For example, 200 Hispanics passed a test out of 1000 Hispanics who
took the test; versus 500 whites who passed the test out of 1000 whites who
took the test. Accordingly, Hispanics passed the test at a 20% rate compared
to whites who passed the test at a 50% rate. Thus, if we were using the fourfifths rule, there would be a disparate impact in this case (20/50 is only 40%well below the 80% level needed).
72. The Supreme Court in Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States noted
that a gross disparity between the protected group in the relevant labor
market versus the protected group in an employer's workforce is sufficient to
meet the plaintiffs burden of proof of discrimination. 431 U.S. at 337. For
example, if there are 10,000 Native-Americans in the relevant labor pool
versus 40,000 persons available in the relevant labor pool, this would equate
to a twenty five percent Native-American available labor market rate.
However, if the particular employer only employed fifty Native-Americans
versus 1000 total employees employed by the employer, this would equate to
only a five percent Native-American employment rate. Most likely, the
disparity between the available labor-market rate and the employment rate in
such a case would satisfy the plaintiffs burden of proving discrimination.
73. Id. at 1697.
74. Id.
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III. ANALYSIS
Now that individuals can bring disparate impact claims under
the ADEA, the big question becomes: what comparison group can
the plaintiff use to help establish a disparate impact claim? Lower
courts have struggled to establish a uniform test for determining
whether the plaintiff has established a prima facie case of
disparate impact under the ADEA."5 The biggest reason for this
struggle arises from the lower courts' attempt to define the
disparately impacted group." This is because age is progressive,
unlike factors relevant to Title VII discrimination cases (e.g.
Hispanics versus non-Hispanics, or women versus men). Thus, the
comparison groups in ADEA disparate impact claims are not
always as obvious when compared with Title VII claims."
However, there are some clear, and not so clear, comparison
groups courts can use to determine if the plaintiff has established
a prima facie claim for disparate impact under the ADEA. These
groups include: the "bright-line" rule;"8 sub-grouping; 9 and

75. See Ellis v. United Airlines, Inc., 73 F.3d 999, 1009 (10th Cir. 1996)
(implying that courts have struggled with defining what tests and statistical
data will satisfy the plaintiffs prima facie case of disparate impact under the
ADEA, and that courts will continue to struggle with this dilemma).
76. See id. ("[Tihe line defining the class that is disparately impacted by the
[employer's] policy is an imprecise one .. . ."); see also Mullin v. Raytheon Co.,

2 F. Supp. 2d 165, 174 (D. Mass. 1998) (noting the difficulty in defining what
age group was disparately impacted).
77. The lack of clarity can lead to statistical manipulation by the plaintiff.
See RAMONA L. PAETZOLD & STEVEN L. WILLBORN, THE STATISTICS OF
DISCRIMINATION 7-24 (1996) (stating that when there are no constraints on
the types of groupings available, manipulation of age grouping in order to
obtain particular statistical results is possible). However, there are also ways
to manipulate data under a Title VII disparate impact claim. This would often
occur when two or more protected categories are combined to show
discrimination.
Joel S. Allen, Melissa M. Hensley & Scott Sherman,
Employment and Labor Law: Split Decisions: The Lack of Consensus on
Disparate Impact Claims Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,
29 OKLA. CITY U.L. REV. 63, 85 (2004). For example, there may be no evidence
of disparate impact against Hispanics or women, but Hispanic women might
be able to show disparate impact.
78. See Lowe v. Commack Union Free Sch. Dist., 886 F.2d 1364, 1373 (2d
Cir. 1989) (ruling that the impact on the protected group as a whole is to be
used to establish a prima facie case for disparate impact claims brought under
the ADEA); see also EEOC v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 191 F.3d 948, 950-51
(8th Cir. 1999) (implying that age impact cases can only be established by
providing evidence that the protected group as a whole was affected, and not
some specific group within the protected group).
79. Some courts, however, have refused to allow this test altogether. See
McDonnell Douglas, 191 F.3d at 950-51 (rejecting the use of sub-grouping
within the protected class to show adverse impact from a reduction in
workforce). Cf Katz v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 229 F.3d 831, 835-36 (9th
Cir. 2000) (refusing to rule whether sub-grouping was available under ADEA
disparate-impact claims).
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statistical tests based on individuals and not groups (e.g. logistic
regress analysis and multivariate analysis)."
While these
"groups" all have their own distinct advantages, they also have
disadvantages when applied to an ADEA disparate impact claim.
A. The "Bright-Line"Rule
While it is conceivable that the courts can establish multiple
bright-line rules8' for making out a prima facie case of disparate
impact, one bright-line rule has been used in the lower courts prior
to the Smith decision.82 Under this bright-line rule, a plaintiff
establishes a disparate impact claim by presenting evidence of a
statistically significant disparity between the impact of an
employment policy on employees forty years old and over versus
the policy's impact on employees under forty.' The Second and
Eighth Circuit Courts have employed this bright-line rule.'
1. Advantages of the Bright-Line Rule
First, the one obvious advantage to this rule is that it is a
bright-line solution. Courts would have no problem employing the
test because of its simplicity.' Second, plaintiffs would not be able
to manipulate age groupings to produce their desired statistical
result. For example, a plaintiff would not have a viable disparate
impact claim if employees sixty-years old and over were
80. Gregory L. Harper, Statistics as Evidence of Age Discrimination, 32
HASTINGS L.J. 1347, 1362-66 (1981).
81. Sub-grouping might also be considered a bright-line rule. For example,
courts can use the rule of fives. The rule of fives breaks groups accordingly:
forty to forty-four; forty-five to forty-nine; fifty to fifty-four; etc. Under the
rule of fives, the fifty to fifty-four-year-old group could bring a disparate
impact claim under the ADEA if they show a particular employment policy
adversely affected their age group, even if it did not adversely affect any other
age group. As discussed infra notes 92-102 and accompanying text, this
bright-line rule would have advantages, but would also have disadvantages.
82. See supra note 78 (identifying case law showing that the Second and
Eighth Circuit only allow a disparate impact claim under the ADEA if the
forty- year-old and above group as a whole is disparately impacted).
83. Fentonmiller, supra note 10, at 1123. For example, if seventy percent of
qualified employees thirty-nine years old and under are hired, but only forty
percent of qualified employees forty years old and over are hired, the fortyyear-old and over group could use the EEOC's four-fifths test to prove
disparate impact. Using this rule, the ratio would be 40/70, or approximately
fifty-seven percent, which is well short of the eighty percent needed. Thus,
under the bright-line rule, through the use of the four-fifths test, a disparate
impact claim would exist.
84. Lowe, 886 F.2d at 1373; McDonnell Douglas, 191 F.3d at 950-51.
85. The word simplicity, used in this context, means that, compared to the
other tests courts can and have used, the bright-line test is simple. Yet, even
under the bright-line rule, there is a wealth of statistical data that might be
required to prove a disparate impact claim. This only serves to complicate a
.simple" rule.
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disparately impacted, but not the forty-year-old and over group as
a whole. Third, this rule would make it easier on the employers to
plan against any policies that might have a disparate impact.'
2. Disadvantagesof the Bright-Line Rule
There are three glaring disadvantages to applying this brightline rule.
First, applying this rule might unfairly prejudice
employees who are, for instance, sixty-five and older.
For
example, having a workforce where the vast majority of employees
are between the ages of forty and forty-five is very conceivable.
However, at such a company, a particular neutral policy may be
restricting employees sixty-five years-old and over, even though
they are equally, if not more qualified than the forty to forty-five
year-old employees. Under the bright-line rule, the employees
sixty-five years old and over would have no recourse under the
ADEA for disparate impact. In other words, the sixty-five-year-old
and over group was disparately impacted, but the forty and over
group was not.87 Essentially, an employer could realistically adopt
a facially-neutral policy that has a significant disparate impact on
employees over the age of sixty-four, as long as that policy does not
disparately impact the overall group of employees who are forty
years old and over.
Second, disparate impact claims are "functionally equivalent"
to disparate treatment claims.' However, following the bright-line
rule would allow disparate treatment claims to be more broad than
disparate impact claims under the ADEA."9 In other words, a
86. This type of planning would be analogous to how employers decide
policies when considering Title VII discrimination issues. In other words,
employers take into consideration the impact a policy will have on race. This
test will make consideration of age impact the same: does it affect employees
forty and older?
87. The reverse is also true. A forty-year-old employee may not be
disparately impacted by an employment practice, but the forty-year-old and
older group as a whole who are disparately impacted by the practice might
afford the forty year-old a remedy under this bright-line test.
88. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 987 (1988)
(stating that disparate treatment claims and disparate impact claims are
"functionally equivalent" and either claim can be applied to a particular fact
pattern).
89. In O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers, Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 312-13
(1996), the Supreme Court stated that a plaintiff bringing a disparate
treatment claim under the ADEA need not produce evidence that he was
replaced by someone outside the protected class to establish his prima facie
case. Instead, the Court held it was sufficient for the plaintiff to establish that
his replacement was "substantially younger." Id. The Court further noted
that whether the person who replaced the terminated plaintiff is "outside the
protected class" is not a reliable criterion. Id. Therefore, the Supreme Court
does not require a bright-line rule for disparate treatment claims under the
ADEA. Rather, all that is required is an imprecise determination that the
replacement is "substantially younger." Id.
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sixty-five-year old employee who was intentionally fired because of
his age and replaced by a forty-five-year-old employee would have
a claim of disparate treatment under the ADEA. However, if a
group of sixty-five-year-old employees were fired in favor of a
group of forty to forty-five-year-old employees because of an
unjustified, albeit neutral, policy, this group would not have a
claim of disparate impact under the ADEA. 0
Essentially,
plaintiffs would not be afforded equivalent protection under both
claims.
Third, and perhaps most importantly, this rule would
contradict the ADEA language. As stated in the statute, the
ADEA is meant to protect "individuals" and not groups."
Implementing this rule would protect the group of employees who
fall within the forty and over age bracket. However, it would not
protect the individual sixty-five-year-old employee who was
disparately impacted by a facially neutral company policy.
B. Sub-Grouping
A sub-grouping rule would allow a plaintiff to "sub-group" his
age to prove that an employer's neutral policy disparately
impacted his or her group, even though it might not have
disparately impacted the whole forty-year-old and over group.92
Taken from the examples above, if a sixty-five-year-old employee
can establish statistically that a specific neutral employment
policy disparately impacts employees sixty-five and over, that
employee would have a viable disparate impact claim. This is true

90. Interestingly, the sixty-five-year-old group would have a disparate
impact claim under the ADEA if the employment practice discriminates
against their group in favor of thirty-nine year olds, but not when it
discriminates in favor of forty-year-olds.
91. The ADEA states: "[lilt shall be unlawful for an employer... to deprive
any individual of employment opportunities... because of such individual's
age ...

."

29 U.S.C. § 623 (a)(2)(emphasis added).

The Supreme Court in

O'Connor explained that the ADEA does not prohibit discrimination only
against those employers forty years and older, but prohibits discrimination
against employees because of their age, with the limit on the protected class to
those forty years and older. 517 U.S. at 312-13. The main focus then becomes
whether an individual, not a group, suffered age discrimination vis-A-vis any
other person or persons in any other age group.
This exact point was made when the ADEA was passed in 1967.
Senator Yarborough in effect stated that if a forty-two-year-old and a fifty-twoyear-old applied for the same job, the employer "could not turn either one
down on the basis of the age factor." 113 Cong. Rec. 31,255 (1967) (statement
of Sen. Yarborough).
92. This is similiar to what the Supreme Court has allowed for disparate
treatment claims under the ADEA. See O'Connor, 517 U.S. at 312-13 (stating
that the person who replaced a terminated employee need not be "outside the
protected class").
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even if employees forty years old and over as a whole are not
disparately impacted by that same specific employment practice.
1.

Advantages of Sub-Grouping

While this rule would not necessarily protect individuals, it
would focus on smaller groups of employees instead of the fortyyear-old and over group as a whole. Thus, individuals would be
better protected under this rule than under the bright-line rule
previously discussed. As shown from the above example, the sixtyfive-year-old employee would be able to bring a disparate impact
claim under the ADEA even if the whole forty year-old and over
group did not suffer disparate impact.
Further, this rule would essentially eliminate a major
negative of the bright-line rule: it would preclude employers from
adopting an unjustified, albeit neutral, policy that disparately
impacts employees who are fifty-five years old and over, but not
the forty year-old and over group as a whole.93 In other words,
sub-grouping would not "permit policies and practices that clearly
have an adverse impact on individuals based on their age to
escape judicial scrutiny."94
2. Disadvantagesof Sub-Grouping
There are two major problems associated with this rule.
First, there is the problem of deciding what sub-groups to use. 95
Since it is extremely rare for two people to be born at the same
time, plaintiffs could divide sub-groups in all different ways.9"
93. See Graffam v. Scott Paper Co., 848 F. Supp. 1, 4 (D. Me. 1994)

(providing a similar hypothetical).
94. Id.; see also Finch v. Hercules Inc., 865 F. Supp. 1104, 1129 (D. Del.
1994) (stating that prohibiting age discrimination within sub-groups was the
type of age discrimination Congress sought to prohibit).
95. Interestingly, the Supreme Court in Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440,
455 (1982), did not rule out sub-grouping for disparate impact claims under
Title VII.
The Court stated that determining whether a particular
employment policy is fair to the class as a whole does not justify unfairness to
an individual class member. Id. Consequently, the Court stated: "Title VII
does not permit the victim of a facially discriminatory policy to be told that he
has not been wronged because other persons of his or her race or sex were
hired." Id. Thus, a woman, who was excluded from the hiring process, would
still have a valid disparate impact claim even if the overall hiring process
resulted in women as a group faring as well as the employees. Id.
96. For instance, a forty-five-and-a-half-year-old employee files a disparate
impact suit under the ADEA. The employee wants to establish a sub-group to
establish his prima facie case for disparate impact. The employee first looks to
employees between forty-five years old and above. However, if he were to use
this sub-group, there would be no disparate impact because there are multiple
other employees who just turned forty-five years old. Thus, the employee will
attempt to divide the sub-group up to include forty-five-and-a-half-year-olds
and older, because this would help establish a disparate impact claim.
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This would allow plaintiffs to manipulate the statistical data to
provide them with a particular sub-group that has been
disparately impacted.97
Second, implementing this rule would make the jobs of
employers much more difficult.98 They would have to spend an
ample amount of time ensuring that each employment decision on
certain policies did not disparately impact an age sub-group. Not
only would this be tedious and time consuming, but it would also
cost the employer money as well. Further, this would lead
employers to account for age when making employment decisions
on certain policies, which is precisely what the ADEA prohibits.'
There is another problem, albeit a minor one, which concerns
reverse discrimination claims. 00 Reverse discrimination claims
occur when a sub-group of employees forty years old and over
alleges that they were disparately impacted by a specific
employment policy as compared to older employees.'
For
In McDonnel Douglas, the Eighth Circuit strongly condemned the use of
sub-grouping as a means for establishing a prima facie case for disparate
impact when it stated:
If disparate impact claims on behalf of subgroups were cognizable under
the ADEA, the consequence would be to require an employer engaging
in an [sic] RIF to attempt what might well be impossible: to achieve
statistical parity among the virtually infinite number of age subgroups
in the workforce. Adopting of such a theory, moreover, might well have
the anomalous result of forcing employers to take age into account in
making layoff decisions, which is the very sort of age-based decisionmaking that the statute proscribes.... We have held that employment
decisions motivated by factors other than age (such as retirement
eligibility, salary, or seniority), even when such factors correlate with
age, do not constitute age discrimination. We certainly do not think that
Congress intended to impose liability on employers who rely on such
criteria just because their use had a disparate impact on a subgroup.
191 F.3d at 951 (citations omitted).
97. For instance, a forty-four-and-a-half-year-old employee could bring a
disparate impact claim under the ADEA against an employment practice
alleging that employees between the ages of forty-four and forty-seven were
disparately impacted. She could bring this claim even though employees
between the ages of forty and forty-three, employees forty-eight and older, or
employees forty and over as a whole are not disparately impacted by the
practice.
98. See Ellis v. United Airlines, 73 F.3d 999, 1099 (10th Cir. 1996) (stating
there are countless facially-neutral selection criteria and other employment
practices whose effect on individuals differ depending on their age at the time
a business decision is made). For example, reductions in workforce are
typically designed to cut salary and benefit costs. Typically, the employees
who make the most salary and who have the higher benefits are the older
employees. Thus, the employer would have to spend countless resources
determining whether a particular sub-group was disparately impacted by the
reductions in workforce.
99. McDonnell Douglas, 191 F.3d at 951.
100. Allen, Hensley & Sherman, supra note 77, at 85.
101. Id.
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instance, a particular employment practice might have a severe
effect on employees between the ages of forty and forty-five, but
not on employees forty-five-years-old and over. The employees in
the forty to forty-five year old group would then attempt to bring a
disparate impact claim based on reverse discrimination. While
most courts do not recognize reverse discrimination claims brought
under the ADEA, some courts have allowed plaintiffs to bring such
claims.' 2 Of course, this would also increase difficulties in making
employment decisions. Employers would now also have to account
for reverse discrimination problems as well.
C. StatisticalTests that Focus on Individuals Rather Than
Groups
While the analysis of a disparate impact claim under Title VII
focuses on groups being disproportionately impacted, 3 "the best
statistical tests for ADEA cases are those that do not employ
grouping. "1 One statistical test that a plaintiff could use is called
"mean analysis." 0" This test compares what the average age of
employees who are adversely affected by an employment practice
against the average age of the entire employee population." The
probability that the difference between the two mean ages resulted
by chance can be calculated using various statistical formulas."'
While this analysis focuses more on individuals than groups,
it generally fails to reveal which individuals among the group of
disparately impacted employees were actually impacted."
For
instance, a fifty-year-old employee who claims he was disparately
impacted by a specific policy might use the mean analysis to show
102. See Cline v. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc., 296 F.3d 466, 469-71 (6th
Cir. 2002) (allowing the type of reverse discrimination case, as given in the
example above, but refusing to the label it a reverse discrimination claim).
103. See Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15 (1977)
(stating that claims for disparate impact under Title VII involve employment
practices that "fall more harshly on one group than another"). In other words,
whether African-Americans or Hispanics as a group were disparately
impacted by a particular employment practice would determine whether there
is a disparate impact claim under Title VII. But see supra note 87 (noting how
a person might recover based on disparate impact touching a group as a whole,
but not impacting the person as an individual).
104. Harper, supra note 80, at 1362.
105. Id. at 1362.
106. Id. at 1363.
107. Harper discusses the possible use of "mean analysis" in ADEA cases
using the "z statistic" which is derived form the central limit theorem. Id. at
1362-66. However, as Luce points out, this analysis has a drawback: "it can
reveal that the discrepancy in the means is not by chance, but it does not
reveal how much, if any, of the discrepancy is explained by some factor other
than age." George 0. Luce, Comment, Why DisparateImpact Claims Should
Not Be Allowed under the Federal Provisions of the ADEA, 99 Nw. U.L. REV.
437, 489 n.322 (2004).
108. Luce, supra note 107, at 489.
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that the practice had a significant disparate impact on age, but
this would not prove that it disparately impacted the actual fiftyThe data may actually reveal that the
year-old employee.
disparate impact was focused on other ages in the age distribution
(i.e. sixty-year-olds), but not fifty-year-olds.
The next two methods, however, can establish that a
plaintiffs particular age explains a disparate impact he suffered
First, is the
from a neutral employment policy or practice."
logistic regression analysis.11 ° This statistical analysis is used to
estimate the probability that an employee of a certain age will be
disparately impacted by a specific employment policy or practice,
based on the relationship between age and the effect of the policy
on each employee in the population."1
The second analysis that focuses strictly on the individual's
age is the multivariate analysis."' This analysis indicates how
much the probability of the disparate impact's occurrence is
explained by other non-age factors, such as cost, or years of
service."'
However, while both of these tests focus on the
plaintiffs age, they are both complex,"' and costly to administer"'
and validate.

109. See id. (stating that these statistical tests require a number of
assumptions and experts to validate the assumptions). Consequently, cost
becomes a major downfall for using statistical tests for disparate impact
claims under the ADEA.
110. Robert Timothy Reagan, Federal Judicial Center Statistical Examples
Software Prototype:Age DiscriminationExamples, 42 JURIMETRICS J. 281, 293

(2005).
111. Id. at 293-95.
112. Id.
113. Id. This test "assumes that the natural logarithm of the odds on [the
adverse affect occurring] is a linear function of age." Id. at 289.
114. Two converse arguments have been set forth regarding the complexity
of the statistics. Herbert and Shelton argue that Congress never intended for
jury trials in Title VII disparate impact cases because the statistics are too
complex for lay people. Douglas C. Herbert & Lani Schweiker Shelton, A
PragmaticArgument Against Applying the DisparateImpact Doctrine in Age
Discrimination Cases, 37 S. TEX. L. REV. 625, 650-60 (1996). However,
Fentonmiller argues that the reason Congress did not make jury trial
available in Title VII disparate impact cases is not because of the statistical
complexity, but rather that damages are not available for such claims; thus,
there is no constitutional right to jury trial for such claims. Fentonmiller,
supra note 10, at 1123 n.315.
115. As Evan H. Pontz points out, there is a major difficulty in administering
a statistical test for an ADEA disparate impact claim, namely identifying the
relevant populations for the comparisons. Evan H. Pontz, Comment, What a
Difference ADEA Makes: Why DisparateImpact Should Not Apply to the Age
Discriminationin Employment Act, 74 N.C. L. REV. 267, 278-79 (1995). For
instance, the total number of employees at a particular company changes on a
frequent basis. Id. Further, older workers retire and are replaced by younger
employees. Id. This greatly complicates the statistical analysis. Id.
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IV. PROPOSAL
116
In establishing a prima facie case for disparate impact,
plaintiffs should be allowed to use statistical tests that are based
on individuals and not groups. Courts should not treat the age
variable as a dichotomous variable, where a disparate impact
claim would fail if the whole forty and over group was not
disparately impacted (i.e. the "bright-line" rule discussed above).
Nor should the courts allow plaintiffs to "sub-group" their ages to
establish a disparate impact claim. Yet, allowing plaintiffs to use
statistical tests that do not require age grouping also has its
imperfections. However, there will always be some imperfection
no matter which approach is taken by the courts. Further, an
approach focusing on individuals seems more in line with Supreme
Court's decisions regarding discrimination in general." '
116. While there are small variations to the elements needed to establish a
disparate impact claim under the ADEA, generally a plaintiff must: (1)
identify a facially neutral employment policy of the employer that (2) causes
(3) a statistically discernable disparate impact on a protected employee group.
Mullin v. Raytheon Co., 2 F. Supp. 2d 165, 173 (Mass. 1998). The protected
employee group in ADEA cases is an employee who is forty years of age or
older. 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (2000). The main focus of the proposal in this
comment is on how a plaintiff should satisfy the third element. In order to
satisfy this element, a plaintiff should use statistical data to prove he or she
was disparately impacted. However, in order to do that, the plaintiff must use
the "bright-line rule," sub-grouping technique, both of which this comment
rejects, or use statistical tests that focus on individuals, which this comment
proposes is the best way to satisfy the third element.
117. In Teal, 457 U.S. at 453, the Supreme Court ruled that Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted to protect individuals and not protect
groups as a whole. In that case, African-American employees brought a
disparate impact claim under Title VII. Id. at 443. The employer required
employees to pass a written exam as one step in obtaining permanent status
as a manager. Id. The exam results yielded a fifty-four percent pass rate for
African-American candidates and a seventy-nine percent pass rate for
Caucasian candidates. Id. at 443 n.4. Nevertheless, the employer promoted
approximately twenty-three percent of the African-American candidates and
approximately fourteen percent of the Caucasian candidates. Id. at 444.
The District Court ruled that at the "bottom line" the employer's policy
did not adversely affect African-American candidates. Id. at 445. Therefore,
the plaintiffs did not establish a prima facie case for disparate impact. Id.
However, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed this ruling and the
Supreme Court affirmed. Id. The Court rejected the bottom line argument,
stating that "Congress intended Title VII to achieve equality in employment
opportunities for every individual, not just equality in the overall number of
minorities actually hired or promoted." Id. at 453. The Court reasoned that
Congress did not intend to allow employers to discriminate against some
employees while favorably treating other employees within that protected
group. Id. at 455.
In reaching its conclusion, the Court relied on section 703(a)(2) of Title
VII, which prohibits practices that would deprive or tend to deprive "any
individual of employment opportunities." Id. at 453-54 (citation omitted).
Section 703(a)(2) provides the statutory basis for the disparate impact theory
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If the courts were to use the "bright-line" rule, which treats
age as a dichotomous variable, they would blatantly ignore the
purpose of the ADEA. The ADEA is meant to protect individuals
and not groups. As the Supreme Court stated in O'Connor, "[the]
language [of the ADEA does not ban discrimination against
employees because they are aged [forty] or older; it bans
discrimination against employees because of their age, but limits
the protected class to those who are [forty] or older.""8 Thus, the
ADEA prohibits discrimination on the basis of age and not class
membership. Accordingly, the approach of grouping all forty-yearolds and above as one group should not be employed by the courts.
The use of sub-grouping by the courts would be equally flawed
and would lead to multiple problems. Plaintiffs could essentially
manipulate the statistical result by making an arbitrary decision
of who should be in the comparison group."9 For instance,

under Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(2)(a)(2) (2000). The same language of
section 703(a)(2) also appears in the ADEA section 623(a)(2). 29 U.S.C.
§ 623(a)(2) (2000).
In Smith, the Supreme Court essentially reached its decision that
disparate impact is available under the ADEA because the language in both
the ADEA and Title VII are almost identical. 544 U.S. at 232. Since disparate
impact was available under Title VII, the Smith Court reasoned it should also
be available under the ADEA because of the identical language. Id. at 235-36.
Thus, the Court would ostensibly hold that the disparate impact claims under
the ADEA, just like disparate impact claims under Title VII, protect
individuals and not groups. See also Graffam v. Scott Paper Co., 848 F. Supp.
1, 4 (Me. 1994) (stating that a rule that plaintiffs may only establish a
disparate impact claim under the ADEA by showing the forty year old and
over group as a whole was disparately impacted would allow employers'
policies that "clearly have an adverse impact on individuals based on their age
to escape judicial scrutiny").
118. O'Connor, 517 U.S. at 312-13. O'Connor was a unanimous decision by
the Supreme Court on a disparate treatment case under the ADEA. Id. at
309. However, the issue in that case was whether the plaintiff must show he
was replaced by someone outside the protected group (i.e. someone under forty
years old) to establish a claim under the ADEA. Id. Thus, the Court was
essentially deciding what the purpose of the ADEA was (i.e. that the ADEA
protects individuals and not groups). This reasoning should also apply to
disparate impact claims brought under the ADEA. But see Mullin, 2 F. Supp.
at 174 (stating that the O'Connor reasoning should only be applied to
disparate treatment claims under the ADEA, and further noting that "[tihe
reasoning behind [the O'Connor decision] is less compelling in a disparate
impact case, where the proof derives its force from an analysis of the impact on
the protected group as a whole").
119. The Second Circuit has expressly condoned the use of sub-grouping for
disparate impact claims brought under the ADEA. Lowe, 886 F.2d at 1373
(2d. Cir. 1989). The Lowe court set forth an example, albeit an unlikely one,
which shows some of the shortfalls of using sub-groups. The example states
that if the sub-group approach was followed "an 85 year old plaintiff could
seek to prove a discrimination claim by showing that a hiring practice caused
a disparate impact on the 'sub-group' of those age 85 and above, even though
all those hired were in their late seventies." Id. However, the Lowe court did
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consider a fifty-one-year-old employee who is fired from his job and
brings a disparate impact claim against his employer. Assuming
he establishes the first two elements of a disparate impact claim,
he would then attempt to sub-group ages to establish the third
element. There may be no disparate impact on the forty and above
group as a whole. Nor would the use of a group of employees fifty
to fifty-five years old establish a disparate impact claim. However,
a sub-group of employees between fifty-one and fifty-four years old
would be more likely to establish a disparate impact claim against
the employer. Thus, this hypothetical employee would attempt to
use this sub-group to establish his claim, even though many other
sub-groups would not establish the claim. With just a little
imagination, one can tell that plaintiffs could find a sub-group that
helps them establish a disparate impact claim.
To remedy this problem, courts could establish sub-groups
with a fixed number of years. For instance, plaintiffs could only
use sub-groups of forty- to fifty-year-olds, fifty- to sixty-year-olds,
and sixty-year-olds and above. However, this has the same major
flaw as using the forty year old and above group: it takes class
membership into account and not individuals, which is neither the
purpose nor spirit of the ADEA.
Further, the use of sub-grouping would ostensibly raise more
questions for the court then answers.
Once a sub-group is
introduced, at least three categories are formed: the under fortyyear-old group (the unprotected class), the sub-group of forty year
olds and above not included in the disparate impact showing, and
the sub-group alleged to have suffered the disparate impact.
The formation of these three categories when sub-grouping
requires courts to deal with many additional questions, such as:
whether the sub-group bringing the disparate impact claim should
include all people over a certain age or include only people within
a certain age range (for example, employees between the ages of
fifty-one and fifty-four); whether the comparison group should
include all people under a certain age or include only some people
under a certain age (for example, if the allegation is a disparate
impact against employees over forty-five years old, should the
comparison group include all employees under forty-five years old
or only employees under forty years old); and, whether the
comparison group should include people both older and younger
than the sub-group bringing the disparate impact claim (for
example, if the allegation is a disparate impact against employees
between fifty and fifty-five years old, should the comparison group

fall back on the "bright-line" approach requiring the plaintiff to show
disparate impact for the forty year old and above group as a whole, id. at 1374,
which, as this comment states, is also the wrong approach.
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include employees younger than fifty years old and older than
fifty-five years old).
The use of sub-grouping and treating the forty- year-old and
over group as a whole has too many problems for the courts to
effectively use it. While the use of statistical tests not employing
grouping has its fair share of problems, using this approach best
fits the purpose of the ADEA, which, again, is to protect
individuals and not groups. There are a variety of tests, discussed
above, that courts can use for age discrimination cases that focus
on the individual and not a group.
For example, there are statistical tests that can be used for
1
cases that involve large sample sizes, the means analysis test, 20
and small sample sizes, the Mann-Whitney test.'2 1 The means
analysis test does have a drawback though. While the test can
reveal that a discrepancy in the means of the ages is not by
chance, it does not reveal how much, if any, of the discrepancy is
explained by some factor other than age.'
For instance, if
employees whose ages range from fifty to sixty were terminated
because of a cost-based decision by an employer, the employees
might bring a disparate impact claim under the ADEA. The
plaintiffs might use the means analysis test to establish that the
employer's decision had a disparate impact on them. Cost-based
firing, assuming the law allows it, is highly correlated with age.
Thus, the means analysis test would fail to factor this into account
in discerning why the disparity occurred.
However, this is exactly why the ADEA contains the
"reasonable factors other than age provision. " 12' If the plaintiffs
establish a disparate impact claim, the employer would simply
state that the terminations were based on a factor other than age
- namely, cost-based terminations. Unless the plaintiffs could
prove this reason was a mere sham, 24 the employer would win on
120. Harper, supra note 80, at 1362-63.
121. Id. at 1369; see also id. at 1369-74 (illustrating why the Mann-Whitney
test is the superior test over using sub-grouping and how it is applicable to
cases that contain a small sample size). The Mann-Whitney test is also known
as the "rank-sum" test. Id. at 1369.
122. Luce, supra note 107, at 489 n.322.
123. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (2000). The statute specifically states: "It shall not

be unlawful for an employer... to take any action otherwise prohibited under
[the ADEA ... where the [action] is based on reasonable factors other than
age." Id.; see also supra note 65 and accompanying text (stating that the
reasonable factors other than age provision under the ADEA are less stringent
then the business necessity provision under Title VII).
124. Once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case for disparate impact,
the burden of proof shifts to the employer/defendant to prove that the
disparate impact was caused by a reasonable factor other than age.
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-03. Once the employer proves there was
a reasonable factor other than age for its decision or policy, the burden then
shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the employer's reasonable factor other

20061

DisparateImpact and the ADEA

summary judgment or a motion for a directed verdict.
Alternatively, other tests that can be used besides the means
analysis test, such as a logistic regression analysis and a
multivariate regression analysis that take other factors into
account. 125
Not only should courts use statistical tests that focus on
individuals because the purpose of the ADEA is to protect
individuals and not groups, but "[s]tatistical analysis is most
appropriately done on an individual age basis."'26 There is simply
too much difficulty in justifying the use of statistical data for
specific groups or sub-groups.
V. CONCLUSION
Now that the Supreme Court has ruled disparate impact
available under the ADEA, courts must decide if plaintiffs can or
must use groups in helping to establish such a claim. The answer
should be no on both accounts. The ADEA's purpose is to protect
individuals and not groups. Comparison groups do not fulfill that
purpose. Thus, courts should use statistical tests that focus on
individuals and not groups. All tests have imperfections, and such
individual tests are no exception. Individual statistical tests,
however, would fulfill the purpose of the ADEA - protecting
individuals, not groups.

than age was a mere "pretext for discrimination." Id. at 804-05. As the Smith
Court stated, however, it is not required that the employer's selected method
be the only method for achieving the desired goal, unlike Title VII cases.
Smith, 544 U.S. at 243.
125. Reagan, supra note 110, at 293-95.
126. Harper, supra note 80, at 1375.

